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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
ANIMALS 
HORSES. The plaintiffs were injured when their car struck 
two horses owned by the defendant. The horses had escaped a 
fenced area on the defendant’s property. The plaintiffs sued in 
negligence for failure to maintain properly the fences to prevent 
the horses from escaping. The defendant argued that the Iowa 
Legislature had repealed Iowa Code Chapter 169B which required 
livestock to be fenced in by owners and there was no duty at 
common law to fence in the horses. The trial court had granted 
the defendant’s motion to dismiss on these grounds. The appellate 
court agreed that the “fencing in” statute had been repealed in 
1994 and that no common law duty to fence in horses existed. 
However, the court cited Flesch v. Schlue, 191 N.W. 63 (1922), 
which held, prior to enactment of the statute, that a livestock 
owner owed a duty of ordinary care to prevent livestock from 
wandering on to highways. The court characterized the statute as 
providing a presumption of negligence where livestock is not 
fenced in, and, as such, only supplemented the case law in effect. 
The court noted cases in other jurisdictions consistent with a duty 
of ordinary care by livestock owners. Therefore, the court held 
that the dismissal of the case was improper and remanded the 
case for trial. Klobnak v. Wildwood Hills, Inc., 688 N.W.2d 
799 (Iowa 2004). 
BANKRUPTCY 
FEDERAL TAXATION 
PENALTIES. Under I.R.C. § 6658(a) no addition to tax under 
I.R.C. §§ 6651 (failure to file return or pay tax), 6654, 6655 
(failure to pay estimated taxes) is to be made for a period during 
a pending bankruptcy case. The IRS has issued guidance for the 
definition of a pending bankruptcy case. Generally, a bankruptcy 
case is pending from the date of the petition to the closing of the 
case by the court. The discharge of the debtor is not sufficient to 
end the case for this purpose if the payment continues to be 
administered under court supervision. However, once the case is 
closed, the case is no longer pending even if payments continue 
to be made by the debtor under the bankruptcy plan. In addition, 
a case is no longer pending once the court dismisses the case for 
failure of the debtor to complete the plan requirements. Rev. Rul. 
2005-9, I.R.B. 2005-6, 470. 
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL 
PROGRAMS 
BRUCELLOSIS. The APHIS has adopted as final regulations 
adding Arkansas, Louisiana and Michigan to the list of validated 
brucellosis-free states. 70 Fed. Reg. 7839 (Feb. 16, 2005). 
FARM LABOR. The National Agricultural Statistics Service 
has issued farm employment figures as of January 2005. There 
were 749,000 hired workers on the nation’s farms and ranches 
the week of January 9-15, 2005, down 12 percent from a year 
ago. Of these hired workers, 574,000 workers were hired directly 
by farm operators. Agricultural service employees on farms and 
ranches made up the remaining 175,000 workers. Farm operators 
paid their hired workers an average wage of $9.81 per hour during 
the January 2005 reference week, up 40 cents from a year earlier. 
Field workers received an average of $8.73 per hour, up 34 cents 
from January 2004, and livestock workers earned $9.19 per hour 
compared with $8.83 a year earlier. �The field and livestock worker 
combined wage rate, at $8.91 per hour, was up 36 cents from last 
year. The number of hours worked in a week averaged 36.8 hours 
for hired workers during the survey week, down 3 percent from a 
year ago. All NASS reports are available free of charge on the 
internet. For access, go to the NASS Home Page at: http:/ 
www.usda.gov/nass. Sp Sy 8 (02-05). 
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES ACT. 
The debtor was a grocery and general merchandise wholesaler 
who had purchased canned goods and frozen potatoes from creditor 
in the bankruptcy case. The creditors argued that the debtor’s failure 
to pay for the goods created a PACA trust which was not included 
in the bankruptcy estate. The debtor argued that canned goods 
were not perishable agricultural commodities covered by PACA 
and that no resulting trust was created. The court agreed with the 
debtor that canned goods were not perishable agricultural 
commodities covered by PACA in that the canning process 
removed one of the purposes of PACA to protect sellers of 
commodities with a short shelf life. In addition, the statutory 
definition of perishable agricultural commodity in 7 U.S.C. § 499o 
did not including canning in the processes which did not change 
the nature of the commodity. The court held that the sale of the 
canned commodities did not give rise to a PACA trust to cover the 
debtor’s failure to pay for the goods. In re Fleming Companies, 
Inc., 316 B.R. 809 (D. Del. 2004). 
WHEAT. The GIPSA is amending the grain standards to change 
the definition of contrasting classes in Hard Red Winter wheat 
and Hard Red Spring wheat such that Hard White Wheat is not a 
contrasting class but is considered as wheat of other classes. 
GIPSA also is amending the grain standards by adding the sample 
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size used to determine sample grade factors, because the 
standards should transmit this information. 70 Fed. Reg. 8233 
(Feb. 18, 2005).
   FEDERAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The decedent had created 
a trust which became irrevocable on the decedent’s death. The 
trust was required to make distributions to gift trusts established 
by the decedent with the remainder to be distributed to a charity. 
The IRS ruled that the remainder interests passing to the charity 
were eligible for the charitable deduction because the 
noncharitable beneficiary interests were severable. Ltr. Rul. 
200505008, Oct. 15, 2004. 
DISCLAIMERS. The decedent’s estate included funds in 
two pension accounts. The decedent’s will bequeathed the 
residue of the estate, which included the pension funds, to two 
trusts for the benefit of the surviving spouse with remainders 
to the decedent’s children. Within nine months after the 
decedent’s death, the children, through guardians, executed 
written disclaimers of any interest in the trusts and the residue 
of the estate. As a result of the disclaimers, the entire estate 
passed in trust to the surviving spouse. The IRS ruled that the 
disclaimers were effective and that the trust property was 
eligible for the marital deduction as QTIP. In addition, the 
pension funds would be treated as passing directly to the 
surviving spouse and were eligible for tax-free rollover 
treatment when transferred to an IRA in the spouse’s name. 
Ltr. Rul. 200505030, Nov. 12, 2004. 
GIFT. The taxpayer was employed as a manager in a medical 
business operated by a corporation and was a close personal 
friend of the owner of the corporation. The taxpayer received 
bonuses for seven years but did not include the bonuses in 
income in the last three years. The corporation initially did not 
include the bonuses in the taxpayer’s W-2s but later amended 
the W-2s to include the bonuses. The taxpayer, however, did 
not amend the returns for those years to include the bonuses. 
The taxpayer argued that the bonuses were gifts between close 
friends, although the employer did not file gift tax returns. The 
court noted that I.R.C. § 102(c)(1) expressly provides that 
amounts transferred from an employer to an employee are not 
eligible to be excluded from income as gifts under I.R.C. § 
102(a). The court stated that it was irrelevant whether the 
bonuses were paid by a close friend because the statute was 
clear that any employer transfer of funds to an employee was 
subject to income tax; therefore, the bonuses were includible 
in the taxpayer’s income.  Williams v. Comm’r, 2005-1 U.S. 
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,163 (10th Cir. 2005), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 
2003-97. 
MARITAL DEDUCTION. The decedent’s will bequeathed 
the decedent’s interest in the residence and personal property 
to the surviving spouse. The residue of the estate passed to 
the surviving spouse in trust with a bank as trustee. The trust 
provided that the income and principal of the trust was to be 
distributed to the surviving spouse, to the extent the surviving 
spouse and trustee determine are necessary for the spouse’s 
maintenance, education, health or support. The IRS interpreted 
this as limiting the distribution of income to these specific 
uses and only with the consent of the trustee. The IRS noted 
that the limitation was similar to that used to limit a power of 
appointment so that the power is not considered a general 
power of appointment. The IRS ruled that the trust property 
was not eligible for the marital deduction as QTIP because 
the trust did not provide for distribution of all trust income to 
the surviving spouse without limitation and did not grant the 
surviving spouse a general power of appointment over trust 
property.  Ltr. Rul. 200505022, Nov. 8, 2004). 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. The decedent’s estate had 
elected special use valuation of estate property and installment 
payment of estate tax. The estate successfully made early 
installment payments but failed to fully make later payments, 
even with extension of time. The estate also sold several 
parcels of estate property but more than one-third of the 
property was not sold until a foreclosure was completed 
against a portion of the property. The IRS was not aware of 
the foreclosure until it had filed a notice of assessment of all 
estate taxes in August 1991. The IRS filed suit for collection 
of taxes in May 2001. The estate argued that the 10-year statute 
of limitations for collection had expired because the IRS had 
notice of the transfer of more than one-third of the estate 
property in 1990, more than 10 years before the filing of the 
current case. The court held that the IRS did not have notice 
of the foreclosure sale even as much as two years later; 
therefore, the statute of limitations did not begin until the IRS 
gave notice to the estate of the assessment of all estate taxes 
in 1991. United States v. Askegard, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 60,498 (D. Minn. 2005). 
TRANSFEREE LIABILITY. The taxpayer was a 
beneficiary of the decedent’s estate. The estate failed to file 
an estate tax return or pay federal estate taxes. A new estate 
administrator was appointed who sued the former executors 
for mismanagement of the estate. The IRS assessed estate 
taxes of over $8 million, including penalties and interest, and 
assessed some of those taxes against the taxpayer on the basis 
of transferee liability to the extent the taxpayer had received 
estate property. The taxpayer acknowledged transferee liability 
for the taxpayer’s share of taxes but argued that the taxpayer 
was liable only for the interest which accrued from the date 
notice of the liability was filed with the taxpayer. The court 
held that, under I.R.C. § 6901(a), a transferee’s tax liability 
was to be treated the same as the underlying estate’s tax 
liability with interest assessed from the date the taxes were 
due. Saigh v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-20. 
TRUSTS. The taxpayer was the sole beneficiary of a trust 
established by a parent. The trust had income for one tax year 
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and distributed most of the income to the taxpayer, although 
the trust was required to distribute all income to the taxpayer. 
The taxpayer did not include any of the trust income in taxable 
income. The court held that, because all income was required 
to be distributed, the taxpayer had to include all trust income 
in the taxpayer’s personal taxable income. Myers v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Summary Op. 2005-15. 
FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 
CAPITAL ASSETS. The taxpayer had worked as an 
independent contractor insurance agent for a company. Under 
the agent agreement, the taxpayer received commissions for 
existing and continuing insurance contracts acquired and 
administered by the taxpayer. The taxpayer retired in 1996 
and transferred all insurance records to the company which 
entered into an agreement with a new agent. The taxpayer 
sold the taxpayer’s business property and equipment to the 
new agent and the employees continued with the new agent. 
The taxpayer received commission payments during the next 
three years based on insurance contracts obtained by the 
taxpayer prior to retirement. The taxpayer initially included 
these payments in income on tax returns but later filed 
amended returns which claimed the payments as long-term 
capital gains income. The taxpayer argued that the payments 
were the result of the sale of intangible assets, goodwill and 
going concern value, to the new agent and were entitled to 
capital gains treatment. The court held that the payments did 
not result from the sale of goodwill and going concern to the 
new agent because (1) the payment came from the insurance 
company and were based on past services of the taxpayer and 
(2) under the agent agreement, all the goodwill and going 
concern value belonged to the insurance company. Jones v. 
Comm’r, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,174 (S.D. Ala. 
2004). 
COOPERATIVES. The taxpayer was a tax-exempt rural 
electric cooperative. The cooperative offered satellite-based 
internet service under an agreement with a national provider 
of internet services which is also a tax-exempt cooperative. 
The taxpayer provided dial-up internet service and performed 
installation, maintenance and billing services. The internet 
services would be provided on a cooperative basis to existing 
members and new members. The IRS ruled that the offering 
of internet services did not affect the tax-exempt status of 
the taxpayer cooperative. The IRS also ruled that the internet 
services could be combined with the electrical services for 
purposes of determining whether 85 percent of the taxpayer’s 
income comes from services to members. Ltr. Rul. 
200504035, Nov. 2, 2004. 
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The taxpayer 
was employed with a brokerage firm and resigned in 1993. 
In 1997 the taxpayer informed the former employer that the 
taxpayer was a member of a class involved in a class action 
gender discrimination lawsuit and was entitled to a share of the 
proceeds of the settlement of that case. The settlement provided 
payment directly to the taxpayer’s lawyers and payment to the 
taxpayer. A W-2 form was filed for a portion of the settlement 
and a Form 1099 Misc was filed for the remainder of the 
settlement. The taxpayer signed a release of all claims against 
the former employer as part of the settlement. The taxpayer 
argued that the settlement proceeds were excludible from 
income because the payments were made in compensation for 
physical injuries from second-hand smoke during employment. 
The taxpayer claimed that the second-hand smoke claim was 
not included in the settlement agreement in order “to protect 
the employer.” However, the taxpayer presented no evidence 
to support this claim. The court held that, under Banks v. 
Comm’r, 125 S. Ct. 826 (2005) see p. 20 supra., the portion of 
the settlement paid to the taxpayer’s lawyers was included in 
the taxpayer’s income and deductible as an intemized deduction. 
The remainder of the settlement proceeds was also included in 
the taxpayer’s income because the proceeds were not paid in 
compensation for physical injuries. Valia v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Summary Op. 2005-17. 
DISASTER LOSSES. On January 21, 2005, the President 
determined that certain areas in Indiana were eligible for 
assistance under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act (42 USC 5121) as a result of severe winter storms and 
flooding, which began on January 1, 2005. FEMA-1573-DR. 
On February 8, 2005, the President determined that certain areas 
in Kansas were eligible for assistance under the Act as a result 
of severe storms, heavy rains and flooding, which began on 
January 4, 2005. FEMA-1579-DR. Accordingly, taxpayers in 
the affected areas in Indiana and Kansas who sustained losses 
may deduct them on their 2004 federal income tax returns. On 
February 4, 2005, the President determined that certain areas 
in California were eligible for assistance under the Act as a 
result of severe storms, flooding and mudslides, which began 
on December 27, 2004. FEMA-1577-DR. On February 8, 2005, 
the President determined that certain areas in Kentucky were 
eligible for assistance under the Act as a result of a severe storm 
which began on December 21, 2004. FEMA-1578-DR. 
Accordingly, taxpayers in the affected areas in California and 
Kentucky who sustained losses may deduct them on their 2003 
federal income tax returns. 
EMPLOYEE EXPENSES. The taxpayers, husband and wife, 
operated a vending machine business and claimed expense 
deductions for payment of wages to their minor children, ages 
five and 10. The taxpayers claimed that the children helped in 
the business by putting candy bars into the machines, sorting 
the totes full of candy, breaking down the cardboard and sorting 
out the recyclable products of waste produced by the business, 
and counting money. The taxpayers testified that the children 
worked approximately 10 hours per week, although the taxpayer 
did not provide any written work records. The children were 
paid by check but the checks were often cashed much later 
because of a lack of funds in the business account. The funds 
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were not placed in separate accounts for the children but were 
used by the taxpayers in the business or for personal expenses. 
The payments were based on an annual salary tailored to avoid 
requiring the children to file income tax returns. The court held 
that the taxpayers failed to prove that the wages were an 
ordinary and necessary business expense. The court also 
assessed an accuracy-based penalty because the taxpayers failed 
to keep any records to substantiate the claimed deductions. 
Dumond v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2005-11. 
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayer was a dentist with a full 
time practice. The taxpayer owned a one and a half acre rural 
property on which the taxpayer raised and trained horses. The 
court held that the taxpayer did not operate the farm with the 
intent to make a profit because (1) the activity was not operated 
in a business-like manner in that the taxpayer did not keep 
separate accounts and records, did not prepare financial profit 
and loss projections, did not prepare a business plan or 
otherwise analyze the profitability of the activity; (2) the 
taxpayer did not consult experts to even study materials on 
breeding horses; (3) although the taxpayer was a successful 
dentist, the dentist business did not affect the taxpayer’s ability 
to operate a horse breeding activity for profit; (4) the taxpayer 
spent relatively little time on the horse activity compared to 
the dentistry practice; (5) the taxpayer made no changes to stop 
the losses from the activity; and (6) the losses from the horse 
activity offset substantial income from the dentistry practice. 
Giles v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-28. 
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES. The taxpayer corporation had 
commercial real estate which it wanted to sell, in a tax-free 
exchange, to a buyer corporation. The taxpayer owned 62 
percent of the stock of a third corporation and sought to acquire 
property owned by the third corporation through a three party 
exchange. The taxpayer would transfer the property to a qualified 
intermediary who would first sell the property to the second 
corporation and use the funds to purchase the third corporation’s 
property to be transferred by exchange to the taxpayer. The court 
noted that the tax-free exchange rules do not apply to related-
party exchanges if a purpose of the exchange was to avoid 
federal income tax. The court held that the use of a qualified 
intermediary did not remove application of the related party 
rule; therefore, if tax avoidance was a purpose of the transaction, 
the taxpayer could not use the like-kind exchange rules to defer 
gain on the transactions here. The court held that the taxpayer 
failed to prove that no tax avoidance purpose existed for the 
transfers; therefore, the gain from the transactions was taxable. 
Teruya Brothers, Ltd. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 124 T.C. 
No. 4 (2005). 
MOVING EXPENSES. The taxpayer was employed with a 
company in Reno, Nevada for two years before the taxpayer 
was transferred to a company warehouse in Los Angeles, 
California. The company reimbursed the taxpayer for some of 
the moving expenses for the taxpayer’s personal property, the 
cost of a hotel room for three months, and the cost of the 
taxpayer’s meals for three months. The employer paid third 
party providers for most of the expenses of moving the 
taxpayer’s property and some of these payments were not 
reported as income by the taxpayer. The employer also paid 
the taxpayer an amount which was intended to compensate the 
taxpayer for any additional taxes resulting from the amounts 
paid by the employer. The taxpayer claimed moving expenses 
for moving the property, the hotel room and the meals, except 
the additional amount for taxes. The court held that, under 
I.R.C. § 217(b), the cost of the meals was not allowed as a 
moving expense deduction. In addition, the court held that the 
costs of hotel rooms was deductible as a moving expense only 
if incurred while traveling from the old residence to the new 
residence. Because the cost of the hotel room for three months 
was incurred while the taxpayer was located at the new 
employment location, those costs were not deductible as 
moving expenses. Of the remaining moving costs, the court 
held that the taxpayer could claim a moving expense deduction 
only for those costs which were reimbursed by the employer 
and included in the taxpayer’s gross income. The court held 
that, because the moving expenses were paid directly to third 
party providers and not included in the taxpayer’s gross income, 
those moving costs were not deductible by the taxpayer.  Bosco 
v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2005-14. 
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES. The taxpayers, husband 
and wife, each owned one-half of a corporation which leased a 
commercial building to several law firms. The corporation was 
a limited liability company taxed as a partnership. The wife 
was a lawyer in one of the law firms and the husband was a 
medical doctor who provided medical consulting services 
through the corporation for the law firms in addition to the 
husband’s occupation as a university professor. Thus, the 
corporation engaged in three types of services: leasing office 
space, providing legal support services and providing medical 
consulting services. The corporation employed three staff 
persons to provide the legal support services, including legal 
research and computer-assisted research, a law library and 
general maintenance services. The wife was primarily 
responsible for managing the corporation’s services to the tenant 
law firms. The corporation incurred net operating losses for 
the tax years involved and claimed the losses as nonpassive 
activity losses which were passed on to the taxpayers. The 
IRS cited the wife’s substantial income from the practice of 
law to determine that the wife could not have spent sufficient 
time on the corporation’s business to make the losses 
nonpassive. The court determined initially that the taxpayers 
failed to shift the burden of proof on the time spent issue to the 
IRS because the taxpayers failed to provide the timesheets for 
the wife’s activities with the law firm; thus, the taxpayers were 
required to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim 
that the wife’s activities with the corporation’s business were 
enough to qualify for an exception to the passive activity rules. 
The taxpayers argued that the corporation’s activities were 
eligible for the “extraordinary personal services” exception 
under Treas. Reg. § 1.469-1T(e)(3)(ii)(C).  The court cited 
Welch v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-310 which involved a 
carpenter who provided construction services for a movie 
company and also rented equipment to the company. The court 
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in Welch held that the rental income was incidental to the 
provision of services which were the primary motivation for 
hiring the carpenter; therefore, the rental income was nonpassive 
under the extraordinary service exception. The court also cited 
examples in Treas. Reg. § 1.469-1T(e)(3)(v) where tenants 
leased commercial space primarily for the business services 
provided instead of primarily to rent the space involved. The 
court found that the corporation’s  law firm tenants leased the 
office space primarily to obtain the legal services of the support 
staff, law library and the husband’s medical consulting firm 
and not merely to rent office space. The testimony of several 
tenants demonstrated that the availability of the legal services 
was a primary factor in leasing the office space in the building. 
The court held that the rental income was incidental to the 
extraordinary personal services provided to the tenants and the 
rental income and operating losses were nonpassive income 
eligible to offset other income of the taxpayers. Neil Harl will 
write an article on this case for a future issue of the Digest. 
Assaf v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-14. 
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in February 2005 
for purposes of determining the full funding limitation under 
I.R.C. § 412(c)(7), the corporate bond weighted average is 6.07 
percent with the permissible range of 5.46 to 6.07 percent (90 
to 100 percent permissible range). The 30-year Treasury 
securities rate for this period is 5.08 percent, the 90 percent to 
105 percent permissible range is 4.57 percent to 5.33 percent, 
and the 90 percent to 110 percent permissible range is 4.57 
percent to 5.59 percent. Notice 2005-19, I.R.B. 2005-9. 
REPAIRS. The taxpayer owned aircraft used in the taxpayer’s 
freight business. The engines on the aircraft were periodically 
repaired based on actual damage or scheduled maintenance re-
quired either by the engine manufacturer or by federal regula-
tions. The court held that the costs of the aircraft engine main-
tenance were currently deductible as repairs. See Harl, “Repair 
or Capitalize Expenditures,” 14 Agric. L. Dig. 177 (2003). 
FedEx Corp. v. United States, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 
¶ 50,186 (6th Cir. 2005), aff’g, 291 F. Supp.2d 699 (W.D. 
Tenn. 2003). 
RETURNS. The IRS has issued a reminder to taxpayers in 
Connecticut that returns without payments are to be sent to the 
Kansas City, MO service center and returns with payments are 
to be sent to the St. Louis, Mo center. Taxpayers in Virginia 
without payments are to be sent to the Fresno, CA service center. 
Returns from Arizona, Utah and Virginia with payments are to 
be sent to the San Francisco, CA center.  IR-2005-16. 
The IRS has published Publication 946, How to Depreciate 
Property, to its website, www.irs.ustreas.gov/formspubs/ 
index.html, in the Forms & Pubs section. The publication, which 
is to be used when preparing 2004 returns, addresses how to 
recover the cost of business or income-producing property 
through deductions for depreciation (i.e. the depreciation 
allowance, the special Liberty Zone depreciation allowance and 
deductions under the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery 
System). In addition, it explains how to take an I.R.C. § 179 
deduction instead of a depreciation deduction for certain 
properties, how to figure depreciation and how to fill out Form 
4562, Depreciation and Amortization. 
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES 
March 2005 
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly 
Short-term 
AFR 3.08 3.06 3.05 3.04 
110 percent AFR 3.40 3.37 3.36 3.35 
120 percent AFR 3.70 3.67 3.65 3.64 
Mid-term 
AFR 3.83 3.79 3.77 3.76 
110 percent AFR 4.21 4.17 4.15 4.13 
120 percent AFR 4.60 4.55 4.52 4.51 
Long-term 
AFR 4.52 4.47 4.45 4.43 
110 percent AFR 4.98 4.92 4.89 4.87 
120 percent AFR 5.43 5.36 5.32 5.30 
Rev. Rul. 2005-13, I.R.B. 2005-10. 
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The IRS has issued an updated 
version of Rev. Proc. 2005-14, discussed in Harl, “Section 121 
Exclusion and Like-Kind Exchange on Same Property?” p. 17 
supra. 
The taxpayer was employed as a police officer. Shortly after 
purchasing a new condominium residence, the taxpayer was 
assigned to a police dog unit which required the taxpayer to 
keep a dog at the residence. Because the condominium 
association prohibited dogs, the taxpayer sold the condominium 
before the taxpayer had lived in the residence for two years. 
The taxpayer purchased a single-family home at which the dog 
could be kept. The IRS ruled that the sale of the original 
residence was caused by unforeseen circumstances and the 
taxpayer could exclude gain up to the limited exclusion amount. 
The limited exclusion amount was the full exclusion amount 
multiplied by the percentage of two years the original residence 
was owned before the sale. Ltr. Rul. 200504012, Oct. 14, 
2004. 
TRANSFEREE LIABILITY. The taxpayer’s were the three 
children of a parent who owned a farm and adjacent rural 
homestead. As a result of a divorce decree, the parent was 
required to pay the former spouse the value of one-half of the 
farm or to sell the farm and pay the former spouse from the 
proceeds. The parent failed to make the payment and incurred 
unpaid mortgage payments and taxes on the property. In 
addition, the parent incurred unpaid income tax liabilities. In 
an attempt to satisfy the divorce decree and remove the property 
from the reach of the IRS, the parent sold the parent’s interest 
in the properties to the taxpayers for less than the fair market 
value of the property, with an interest the farm transferred to 
the former spouse. The taxpayers and former spouse sold a 
portion of the farm to third parties, resulting in the full payment 
of the former spouse’s divorce claim.  After the transfer to the 
taxpayers and former spouse, the parent was insolvent due to 
the unpaid taxes. The court found that the taxpayers had paid 
only a fraction of the fair market value of the property, the 
property was conveyed to remove it from levy by the IRS which 
held a preexisting claim, and the parent was made insolvent by 
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the transfer. The court held that the taxpayers were liable as 
transferees of a fraudulent transfer for the unpaid taxes plus 
interest and penalties. Suchar v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2005­
23. 
WATER LAW 
ARKANSAS RIVER COMPACT. Case summary by Roger 
A. McEowen. In 1949, Kansas and Colorado entered into the 
Arkansas River Compact. However, the Compact did not end 
disagreements concerning the equitable distribution of the river’s 
upper waters. In 1985, Kansas claimed that Colorado had 
violated the Compact by drilling new irrigation wells that 
“materially depleted” the river water otherwise available for 
use by Kansas water users. A Special Master found that 
Colorado had unlawfully depleted the river in violation of the 
Compact and the Supreme Court agreed, remanding the case 
for remedies. The Special Master recommended that Colorado 
pay Kansas damages, divided the water losses into six categories 
with damages calculated differently for each category, and 
recommended that Kansas be awarded prejudgment interest on 
damages for losses incurred from 1969 through 1994 (the 
judgment’s date).  The Supreme Court adopted the 
recommendations, but held that prejudgment interest would run 
from 1985 instead of 1969. The Special Master subsequently 
filed another report attempting to resolve the remaining issues. 
The Special Master recommended that no river master be 
appointed, that prejudgment interest be granted only from the 
date the complaint was filed, that a 10-year measurement period 
be established to determine Colorado’s future compliance with 
the Compact and to determination by the Colorado Water Court 
of water replacement credits to be applied toward Colorado’s 
obligations. Kansas objected to the recommendations. The 
Supreme Court held that the appointment of a river master was 
not warranted because disputes could also require policy-
oriented decisionmaking directly related to legal issues, and that 
arbitration under the compact was a viable alternative for 
technical disputes. The Court also agreed with the Special 
Master that limiting prejudgment interest from the date of the 
complaint, and only to damages incurred after that date, was 
appropriate. Also, the Court agreed with the Special Master’s 
proposed 10-year measurement period because the use of a 
complex computer model to measure water depletion required 
a substantial measurement period to avoid significant inaccuracies 
which would occur with shorter periods, and Kansas’s right to 
contest adverse decisions of the Colorado Water Court was 
adequately preserved. Kansas v. Colorado, 125 S. Ct. 526 (2004). 
GROUND WATER. Case summary by Roger A. McEowen. 
In a decision that is likely to intensify the water-rights debate in 
Nebraska, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a western 
Nebraska ranch that has surface water rights (dating to 1954) to 
Pumpkin Creek could sue irrigators who pump from the ground 
for taking too much water and drying up the stream. The case 
represents the first time the Court has been confronted with the 
question of whether a surface water appropriator may bring a 
common law claim against the user of hydrologically connected 
ground water.  Nebraska law ignores the hydrological fact that 
groundwater and surface water are linked and the law establishes 
two separate systems for allocating stream flows and groundwater. 
Under the Nebraska Constitution and statutory law, stream flows 
are allocated by priority in time (prior appropriation doctrine), but 
groundwater is governed by the common law rule of reasonableness 
and the Ground Water Management and Protection Act (GWMPA). 
The ranch claimed that water pumped from neighboring wells 
caused Pumpkin Creek to be dry, thereby preventing the ranch from 
irrigating crops and providing water for livestock. While the Court 
held that the doctrine of prior appropriation did not apply to 
groundwater even though groundwater and surface water are 
hydrologically connected, and that the common law claim of 
conversion did not apply because the right to appropriate surface 
water does not involve ownership of property that can be converted, 
the Court held that it would recognize a common law claim for 
interference with surface water by the user of hydrologically 
connected groundwater.  In so holding, the Court determined that 
common law claims were not abrogated by the GWMPA and that 
state law did not allow state natural resource districts (the regulatory 
body governing groundwater) to award monetary damages. The 
Court noted that the common law should acknowledge and attempt 
to balance the competing equities of groundwater users and surface 
water appropriators. Under the test established by the Court, the 
withdrawal of groundwater must have a direct and substantial effect 
upon a watercourse or lake and unreasonably cause harm to a person 
entitled to the use of its water.  The Court reversed the trial court’s 
opinion in favor of the groundwater irrigators and remanded the 
case to the trial court for a trial on the merits. Spear T Ranch, 
Inc. v. Knaub, et al., 269 Neb. 177 (2005). 
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